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IN THE SUPREME. COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OFUTAH 
W. N. PREAS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RAY PHEBUS, PAUL STOCK, JOE 
T. JUHAN, WEBER OIL COM-
pANY, a Colorado Corporation, 
EQUITY OIL COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8104 
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, have been added 
by Appellant). 
Pleadings and Judicial Proceedings 
This action was initially commenced by complaint 
filed by appellant in the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District on May 16, 1950 (R. 1). The case was 
thereafter removed to the Federal District Court of the 
District of Utah, the motion of appellant to remand 
denied, and the case was tried before the Federal Court 
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without a jury on March 12 1951. Thereafter appeal was 
taken to the United States 'court of Appeals, Tenth Cir-
cuit which court remanded the cause to the Utah District 
' Court for further proceedings. Preas v. Phebus, 195 F. 
(2d) 61 (C.C.A. 10). 
After the case was remanded to the State Court, 
the appellant filed an amended complaint (R. 12 to 28). 
The original complaint was in substance that of a typical 
quiet title action, and the amended complaint which 
formed the basis of the present trial (R. 12 to 28) 
retained the substance of the original complaint but 
broadened the issues to include other foundations of 
recovery. The complaint alleges that appellant W. N. 
Preas is the owner of a one-third of 1% oil royalty in and 
to 440 acres of land located on the Ashley Yalley struc-
ture in Uintah County, Utah, that respondents wrong-
fully claim they are the owners of the same, and that 
they liave refused to pay to appellant the royalties to 
which he is entitled following the discovery of oil on 
such lands in 1948. The prayer of the complaint seeks a 
decree to remove the cloud and quiet title in respondent, 
and in the alternative that certain conveyances of record 
be declared void and respondents Ray Phebus and Paul 
Stock compelled to execute a conveyance of such interest 
to appellant, or that the court decree that respondents 
hold the royalty interest in trust for the use and benefit 
of appellant, and finally for an accounting of the pro-
ceeds due appellant from the sale of oil which had been 
produced from said land. 
Respondent Ray Phebus filed an answer disclaiming 
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any interest in the royalty involved (R. 4, 5 ). The remain-
ing respondents filed an answer denying the right of 
recovery and pleading a number of affirmative defenses 
including liinitations, failure of appellant to demand a 
reconveyance of his royalty interest, accord and satis-
faction, estoppel and laches. Many of the facts are 
admitted by the pleadings and will be detailed hereafter. 
The case was tried before the District Court at 
Provo, Utah, on June 1, 1953, and a memorandum deci-
sion filed on July 30, 1953 (R. 35), awarding judgment 
to respondents no cause of action. Findings, conclusions 
and decree were thereafter filed on September 3, 1953 
(R. 38 to 44). 
Facts 
On February 23, 1925, appellant, W. N. Preas, 
acquired by grant from M. P. Smith and Ellen M. Smith, 
his wife, in perpetuity, a royalty interest of 1% of the 
oil and gas in and upon 480 acres of land located in Town-
ship 5 South Range 22 East Salt Lake lVIeridian (Ex-
hibit A), which was duly recorded. 
Thereafter on October 11, 1930, Lucius A. Dick, 
James Wash Sheridan, J. N. Wyman, Ida H. Sheridan, 
Francis llamilton Sheridan, N. J. Meagher and W. N. 
Preas, Appellant herein, as owners of oil and gas royalty 
interests in and to 440 acres of the lands described in 
Exhibit 1, executed an agreement with respondents Paul 
Stock and Ray Phebus (Exhibit C), which was duly 
recorded. As this agreement is in one respect the focal 
point of the controversy herein, the same is set forth in 
full, excluding only the signatures: 
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(Typographical errors are those of the exhibit.) 
"Entry No. 8378 
ASSIGN~1:ENT ROYALTY INTEREST 
This agreement and assignment made this 11th 
day of October 1930 between the undersigned 
owners, partie parties of the first part, and Paul 
Stock of Cody, Wyoming and Ray Phebus of 
Thermopolis, Wyoming parties of the second part, 
WITNESSETH 
Whereas the parties of the first part are the 
owners of certain royalties in the gas now being 
produced and that may hereafter be produced 
from the following described lands situated in the 
County of Uintah, State of Utah, to-wit:- . 
South East quarter (SE14), of Southeast 
quarter ( SE14) of Section fifteen ( 15) East half 
E¥2) of Northeast quarter (NE14) and the North-
east quarter ( NE14) of the Southeast quarter 
(SE14) of Section twenty two (22) Northwest 
quarter (NW14) of the Northwaet quarter (NW-
14) ; South half ( S¥2) of Northwest quarter 
( NW14) ; Southwest quarter ( SW14) of North-
east quarter (NE14); North half (N¥2) of South-
west quarter ( SW14) and the Northwest quarter 
(NW14) of the Southeast quarter (SE14) of Sec-
tion twenty three (23) Township Five (5) South, 
Range Twenty two (22) East; 
and whereas said parties of the first part are also 
the owners of certain royalties in the oil whish 
may be hereinafter be produced and saved from 
said land; AND WHEREAS the parties of the 
second part are the owners of certain Interests 
in the Oil and Gas that may be produced from 
said land and are desirious of negotai ting with 
a responsible oil production Company for the 
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drilling of a deep test well on said ground, but 
cannot perfect said negotiations due to the fact 
that there are now outstanding royalties of eight-
een and one-half (18¥2) persent which it is 
desirable to reduce to a total Royalty of twelve 
and one half (12¥2) percent; AND WHEREAS 
such drilling well not only test such land for oil, 
but offers the posibility of further developing the 
gas production from said land to the benefit of the 
holders of said gas royalties. 
NOW THEREFOR: in consideration of the prem-
ise~ of procuring the drilling od a deep test well 
on said land, for the consideration of One Dollar 
( $1.00) and other valuable considerations the 
undersigned parties of the first part, being the 
owners of the respective royalties interests as 
hereinafter set opposite their respective signa-
tures, do hereby sell, assign and set over unto the 
parties of the second part One third Va of their 
respectice royalty interests in the oil produced 
and saved from said land. 
IT IS EXPRESSTY UNDERSTOOD AND 
AGREEDThat this assignment does not apply to 
the royalty interests of said parties of the first 
part in gas produced from said land. This assign-
ment is made for the purpose of procuring the 
drill.ing of a well to test the said land for oil under 
the agreement between the said Paul Stock and 
Ray Phebus on the one part and the Standard oil 
company of California andjor one of its sub-
sidiaries, on the other part, hereinafter designated 
as the operating Company. If the negotiations of 
the said Paul Stock and Ray phebus shall result 
in the drilling, within the limitations hereinafter 
provided of a test well upon the Ashley Valley 
Structure to the depth of the pennsylvanain for-
mation or to such lesser debth as shall produce Oil 
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in commercial quantities, then this assi.gnrnent 
shall be at full force and effect as to the o~l royal-
ties hereinafter set forth. It is understood that 
the limitations above reffered to are as follows, 
the said operation company is to commence said 
well on the Ashley Valley structure within six 
months after the completion of the deep test well 
whoch shall first be drilled on the Rangley struc-
ture in Northwestern Colorado, said well on the 
Rangley structure shall be commences as soon 
hereafter as weather conditions will permit and 
not later than the summer of 1931, after the com-
mencement if each of the said wells, the drilling 
operations shall be presented with reasonable dili-
gence. If said test well upon the Ashley Valley 
structure shall not be drilled as herein contem-
plated, then in that event the parties of the second 
part hereby agree to reconvey the royalty inter-
ests herein assigned to them to the respective par-
ties of the first part. In Witness whereof we have 
hereunto set our hands and set opposite our re-
spective names the presentage of royalty interest 
affected by this agreement and have caused this 
assignment of One third ~ thereof to be executed. 
NAME Royalty 
Lusius A Dick %% 
James Wash Sheridan 1% 
J. N. Wyman %% 
Ida H. Sheridan %% 
Francis Hamilton Sheridan. 1% 
Mayme Wyman 
N. J. Meagher 2% 
W. N. Preas 1% 
parties of the first part; 
Ray Phebus 
Paul Stock 
parties of the second part; " 
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Since the Clerk has numbered all of the Transcript 
of Proceedings as page 45 of the Record, we shall refer 
hereafter to pages of such Transcript with the letter "'T". 
With reference to Exhibit C, it was stipulated by the 
parties that a well was drilled on the Rangely Structure 
in Northwestern Colorado by Standard Oil Company of 
California or one of its subsidiaries, and that such well 
was spudded in on 1Iay 19, 1931 and completed on July 
31, 1933, at a depth of 7,155 feet. This well was the deep 
test well on the Rangley Structure referred to in Exhibit 
C (T. 10). It was likewise stipulated (T. 10) that neither 
the Standard Oil Company of California, its wholly 
owned subsidiary the California Company, nor any other 
subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of California re-
ferred to in Exhibit C, commenced a well within six 
months after the completion of the test well on the Rang-
ley Structure on July 31, 1933, nor at any other time 
drilled any oil or gas well upon the 440 acres of land 
described in Exhibit C. The conditions precedent to the 
effective assignment set forth in exhibit 0 were never 
performed. 
Subsequent to the execution of Exhibit C and on 
April 30, 1931, Ray Phebus and Paul Stock entered into 
a contract with Standard Oil Company of California with 
reference to drilling operations on said land (Exhibit D). 
On ·November 30, 1931 Paul Sto~k and Ray Phebus 
assigned to Standard Oil Company of California such oil 
royalties as they had acquired, among other royalties, 
under the assignment of October 11, 1930, set forth above 
as Exhibit C (Exhibit F). On December 31, 1931 the 
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Standard Oil Company of California assigned its rights 
acquired under the grants to it from Phebus and Stock 
of April 30, 1931 and November 30, 1931 to its wholly 
owned subsidiary the California Company (Exhibit G). 
On March 21, 1934, the California Company assigned 
back to Ray Phebus and Paul Stock all of its oil and gas 
rights acquired in the property reciting that it had 
elected not to commence the drilling of a test well on the 
Ashley Valley Structure (Exhibit H). 
There are in the record a number of exhibits affect-
ing title to the property and the oil and gas rights located 
in and upon the same, dated subsequent to the reconvey-
ance to Phebus and Stock of the California Company. On 
January 19, 1945 Ray Phebus and Ella Phebus, his wife, 
quit claimed to respondent Joe T. Juhan, all of their 
right, title and interest in and to said lands (R. 15). On 
April 14, 1945, Paul Stock quit claimed his interest in 
said lands to Charles S. Hill (R. 15). On January 5, 
1946, Charles S. Hill and Virginia W. Hill, his wife, quit 
claimed their interest in said lands to Joe T. Juhan (R. 
15). On July 12, 1948, Joe T. Juhan and Genevieve 
Juhan, his wife, quit claimed to Paul Stock an undivided 
1;4 interest in said lands (R. 15). On January 11, 1946, 
Joe T. Juhan and Genevieve Juhan, his wife, quit claimed 
to respondent Equity Oil Company an undivided % of 
their interest in said lands (R. 15). On December 30, 
1947, Equity Oil Company quit claimed to Weber Oil 
Company all of its right, title and interest in and to said 
lands (R. 16). 
On December 30, 1948, respondents Equity Oil Com-
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pany and Weber Oil Company, Joe T. Juhan and Paul 
Stock n1ade and entered into an operating agreement 
wherein Weber Oil Cmnpany, Joe T. Juhan and Paul 
Stock were designated as non-operators, and Equity Oil 
Company was designated as operator. Under the terms 
of this agreement, the 440 acres of land here involved 
were to be drilled, developed and operated for the pur-
pose of exploring, developing and removing oil and gas 
therein contained, and Equity Oil Company was given 
certain liens upon the oil and gas derived from said lands 
as protection for their expenditures, and as such opera-
tors likewise were charged with and did distribute 
royalty payments to the various royalty owners (Exhibit 
I, to which is attached the accounting procedures to be 
followed). 
All of these various agreen1ents and deeds were duly 
recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Uintah 
County at Vernal, Utah. 
The signature of appellant on Exhibit C was nota-
rized on October 17, 1930 (T. 14). Appellant did not 
prepare or request preparation of the agreement, and so 
far as he can recall he had not actually seen it prior to 
the date on which it was executed (T.14). 
Exhibit C states that "In consideration of the prem-
ises of procuring the drilling of a deep test well on said 
land for the consideration of $1.00 and other valuable 
consideration ..... " Appellant tendered proof that he 
did not receive the $1.00 referred to in Exhibit C, which 
tender was rejected by the Court (T. 16). 
The property involved in this action lies approximately. 
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8 to 8¥2 miles away from Vernal (T. 31). At the ti1ne of 
execution of Exhibit C in 1930 appellant was in the sheep 
business (T. 13), and spent a generous portion of his 
time in various states buying and selling such livestock. 
In 1943 Joe T. Juhan was engaged in salvaging pipe 
near the property in question which had been used to 
place gas in the town of Vernal ( T. 55), of which appel-
lant was aware. In 1946 appellant was present for a part 
of one day at the Vernal Court House where the trial of 
Meagher v. Uintah Gas Comparny arnd Valley Fuel Sup-
ply, 185 P. (2d) 747, was in progress (T. 82). He testi-
fied that this case did not involve any problems with 
reference to the oil royalty which is the subject of pres-
ent litigation (T. 68). 
In July of 1948 appellant saw a bulldozer working on 
the property, and was advised by a workman that he 
thought that an oil well was going to be erected (T. 28). 
This was the first time that appellant had any knowledge 
or information whatsoever that anyone was drilling or 
proposing to drill an oil well on the property here in-
volved ( T. 28). His first knowledge that a well was 
actually being drilled for oil was in July 1948 when he 
saw a rig going up (T. 27 and 28) but he had no idea as 
to who was drilling or proposing to drill such an oil well. 
Equity Oil Company, the operator under Exhibit I, which 
was the agreement actually dated December 30, 1948, 
between itself, Weber Oil Company and Juhan and Stock, 
spudded in a well on the property on August 1 1948 
' ' which was completed as a producing well on September 
18, 1948 (T. 75). 
10 
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About noon of November 18, 1948, appellant receive<i 
a check from the Equity Oil Company (Exhibit K), which 
contained an endorsement, from which he gathered for 
the first tim~ that there was some question as to whether 
or not there was an adverse claim to his :Y3 of 1% oil 
royalty cr. 18). So far as he knew this was the first 
information from any source tha.t there was such an 
adverse claim on the part of respondents or their prede-
cessors in interest in existence subsequent to 1933 (T. 
17). On that sa~ne afternoon he attempted to call Mr. 
Paul Stock at Cody, Wyoming (T. 18) where he was 
advised that Stock was at the Brown Palace Hotel at 
Denver, Colorado C-r. 18). He reached him later that 
afternoon, advised him that he had received the first 
royalty check and asked him what was meant by the 
endorsement referring to the 113 of 1%. Stock then 
advised appellant that the Stock and Phebus agreement 
was a long tin1e ago and that he didn't recall the particu-
lars but would look into it and advise appellant (T. 18). 
Shortly thereafter appellant contacted J. L. Dougan, 
President of the Equity Oil Company, when he again 
asked about the 1;3 of 1% royalty, and was advised that 
the only thing Dougan could do would be follow the 
advice of his attorney, and that if Paul Stock executed 
a reconveyance he would be glad to make payment for 
the royalty on the 1;3 of 1% (T. 22). Appellant continued 
his efforts to reach Stock, who shortly after Christmas 
of 1948 had gone to the Hawaiian Islands ( T. 23). In 
March of. 1949 he talked to Stock and arranged a meeting 
at Salt Lake City with him (T. 24) for the following day. 
11 
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Stock was not present for such meeting (T. 24), and 
appellant was not able to see him prior to the commence-
ment of the initial action, notwithstanding a determined 
effort to do so (T. 25 and 26). 
Prior to November 1948, appellant had not requested 
reassignment of the 1fa of 1 o/o royalty from any of the 
respondents herein, as he was very sure they had no 
interest in his full 1% royalty (T. 48). On April 12, 
1949, acting upon the advice of counsel, appellant wrote 
a letter to Paul Stock at Cody, Wyoming, wherein he 
stated that Mr. Phebus, ~1:r. Dougan and :Mr. Julian had 
all assured him they were willing to reconvey, and also 
that Phebus stated he thought this had been done a long 
time ago. In this letter he also mentioned the possible 
necessity of a law suit and requested Stock to execute 
an assignment which was enclosed, and which the letter 
stated would constitute a purchase on his part of Ya of 
1% (Exhibit 2, T. 50). Enclosed with this letter was a 
post office money order for $10.00 (T. 51). Because of 
his previous experience with the Bank of Vernal, he was 
under the impression that any such document required 
a monetary consideration for its validity (T. 60). At this 
time appellant had received monthly royalty checks from 
Equity Oil Company based upon % of 1% of royalty 
(there has never been any dispute as to his ownership 
of this fractional interest) for a period of five months 
(T. 59), totaling $319.53 (Exhibit J), and he entertained 
no thought whatsoever that the $10.00 payment was in 
any way to represent the value of the royalty or an actual 
purchase of any royalty interest (T. 60, 61). 
12 
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On Decen1ber 29, 1927, W. N. Preas and Ella L. 
Preas, his wife, executed a quit claim deed to said land 
toN. J. Meagher of Vernal, Utah (Exhibit B). When it 
appeared that through inadvertance this had included 
the royalty interest of appellant, on November 28, 1931, 
N. J. Meagher and appellant executed an agreement and 
assignment stating that said quit claim deed was not 
intended to and did not transfer the royalty interest, and 
forinally quit claiming such interest back to appellant 
(R. 13). Later on, on April 28, 1948, N.J. Meagher pre-
pared and executed an identical instrument (Exhibit I). 
The only witness who appeared in behalf of respond-
ents was Joe T .• Juhan (T. 75). He stated that in April, 
1948, he had held a conversation with appellant at Vernal 
and advised him that a well was going to be drilled and 
that appellant should get a deed from Meagher for his 
royalty, and that he didn't think Meagher would ever 
give him a deed (T. 77). He went on to testify that not-
withstanding the fact that he had seen appellant a num-
ber of times subsequent to 1943, he had never discussed 
the agreement between appellant and Phebus and Stock 
(Exhibit C) with him (T. 88). Further, he had examined 
the records in Uintah County in 1943, and had seen a 
copy of this agreeinent, and that he knew at that time that 
no well had been drilled on the Ashley Valley Structure 
lands here involved (T. 83, 85 and 86). When asked why 
it was that he felt appellant had no interest in the oil 
royalty he stated (T. 88): "Because I had seen a docu-
ment of record someplace where he had assigned it to 
Meagher, but I never found where Meagher had assigned 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it back to him." Later, he changed this statement to 
include the Phebus and Stock agreement (R. 91). 
At the time of drilling the well, Juhan testified that 
he had relied upon the record title and the Supreme 
Court decision (T. 80), which decision was Meagher v. 
Uintak Gas Compwny and Valley Fuel Supply, 185 P. 
(2d) 747 (T. 82). He continued that he understood that 
this decision was relative to a modification agreement, 
and didn't know whether or not it involved the Phebus 
and Stock agreement ( T. 89). In fact, there was no issue 
nor reference in this case to such agreement. When asked 
whether the well would have been drilled, Juhan replied 
that they probably would not have drilled with an out-
standing royalty of 18;6% (T. 90). 
The issue in this case involves only one third of the 
1% royalty received by appellant from M. P. Smith 
(Exhibit A). F'ollowing the issue of the initial royalty 
check on November 17, 1948 by Equity Oil Company, 
based upon two-thirds of the 1% interest, which check 
was the first notice appellant had that the respondents 
claimed any interest in the one third interest, respondent 
Equity Oil Company continued to forward such checks 
each month thereafter. A sun1n1ary of these checks is 
contained in Exhibit J, and fifty percent of the total 
amount would equal the value of the one-third of 1% 
royalty payments, or $9,284.88, as appellant does not 
question the accounting accuracy of this Exhibit. Appel-
lant has not cashed, pledged, or in any way used these 
checks because of the endorsement placed thereon by 
Equity Oil Company, notwithstanding the fact that there 
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has never been the slightest question as to his right to 
receive the arnounts of these checks which represent pro-
ceeds of the remaining % of 1% royalty. The endorse-
ment reads as follows:· 
'"Payment in full oil produced and sold dur-
ing October 1948 Ashley Valley No. 1 well under 
Modification Agreement dated May 21, 1927; 
royalty interest 1% from M. P. Smith February 
3, 1925, less assignment V3 of 1% to Paul Stock 
and Ray Phebus October 11, 1930; and the payee, 
by endorsernent of check attached, represents that 
he is the holder and owner of the royalty interest 
in the amount stated." 
STATEJ\IENT OF POINTS 
Appellant relies upon the following points: 
POINT I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAK-
ING AND ENTERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, FOR 
THE REASON THAT THE SAME ARE CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED FACTS, AND AGAINST 
LAW. 
POINT II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAK-
ING AND ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RE-
SPONDENTS AND AGAINST APPELLANT, NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION, FOR THE REASON THAT SAID JUDGMENT IS 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED 
FACTS, AND AGAINST LAW. 
POINT III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT, THE 
SAME BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND STIPU-
LATED FACTS. 
POINT IV. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING APPELLANT'S TENDER OF PROOF THAT 
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE $1.00, WITH REFERENCE 
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TO THE EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
APPELLANT AND PHEBUS AND STOCK, FROM WHICH 
ANY RIGHT OF RESPONDENTS MUST ORIGIN ATE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAK-
ING AND ENTERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, FOR 
THE REASON THAT THE SAME ARE CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED FACTS, AND AGAINST 
LAW. 
POINT II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAK-
ING AND ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RE-
SPONDENTS AND AGAINST APPELLANT, NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION, FOR THE REASON THAT SAID JUDGMENT IS 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND STIPULATED 
FACTS, AND AGAINST LAW. 
Both of the first two points are concerned with the 
fact that the Trial Court failed to properly construe the 
basic agreement between appellant and Phebus and 
Stock, under which no right vested until there had been 
a performance of the condition set forth, and which con-
templated the drilling of a well upon the lands in question 
by Standard Oil Company, or its subsidiary, within the 
time limits indicated. For this reason these points will 
be considered together under the following headings. 
A. An oil royalty is an interest in real property. 
The case is essentially a quiet title action to remove 
a cloud evidenced by Exhibit C. In determining the 
nature and effect of this agreement, it is necessary to 
establish the nature of the royalty interest with which 
such instrument is concerned, i.e., whether that royalty 
is real property or personalty. This question, so far as 
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appellant can determine, is of first impression in Utah. 
Appellant's position is that the royalty here involved is 
real property. 
As the discovery of oil in other states produced liti-
gation in the field of oil and gas law, there was an early 
confusion in the cases fron1 such jurisdictions on this 
question. This arose principally because of the migra-
tory nature of oil beneath the land surface, which dis-
tinguished it frmn other minerals. In the early stages of 
the legal development in the various states concerned 
with oil rights, the courts reached the conclusion that 
interests in oil and gas, whether royalty or otherwise, are 
interests in real property. This is the position of all 
states today in which the question has arisen, although 
there is a variance as to the precise nature of that real 
property interest. See annotations: Oil and Gas Royalty 
as Real or Personal Property, 90 A.L.R. 770; 101 A.L.R. 
884; 131 A.L.R. 1371. 
In Tennant v. Dunn, 110 S.W. (2d) 53, the Texas 
view is summarized as follows: 
"vVhile there was, prior to the decision of 
Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W. (2d) 
1021, 1024, 80 S.W. (2d) 741, confusion in the 
opinions of the courts of this state as to the nature 
of royalty interests, it is settled by that decision 
that royalties, whether payable in money or in 
kind, issuing out of the ordinary oil and gas 
leasehold estate, a determinable fee, 'are interests 
in land; and hence not subject to parol sale, but 
have the protection of the statute of frauds, the 
statutes regulating conveyances and mortgages of 
real estate, and the statutes requiring the record 
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1 d'" of instruments affecting title to or liens on an · 
"The gist of the opinion in Sheffield v. Ho~g 
is that oil and gas royalties, whether payable 1n 
kind or in rnoney, and whether arising from the 
ordinary lease of land in which the lessor owns 
the minerals or from a lease made under the 
' Relinquishment Act should be adjudged to be 
present interests in iand rather than mere rights 
in personalty at some uncertain date, because they 
are profits arising out of land, and, further, be-
cause such classification, which accords with the 
practice in the oil and gas industry, furnishes a 
stability highly important, if not essential to the 
structure of that business. For the same reasons, 
the right created by the assignment to ~irs. Dunn 
should be classified as an interest in land." 
Sheffield v. Hogg, 77 S.W. (2d) 1021, 1024, 80 S.W. 
(2d) 741, indicates a practical reason why oil and gas 
royalties should be treated as real property: 
"The oil industry in Texas is largely depend-
ent for development, growth, or prosperity, on 
the doctrine that the interests we are considering 
-such as the Lessee's and the Lessor's estates 
under contracts which are in customary use in 
Texas-are interests in land; and hence not sub-
ject to parol sale, but have the protection of the 
statute of frauds, the statutes regulating convey-
ances and mortgages of real estate, and the 
statutes requiring the record of instruments af-
fecting title to or liens on land, so that purchasers 
can rely on deed and lien records and can execute 
and receive transfers and conveyances in reliance 
on true abstracts of title and lawyers' correct 
opinions thereon. Were the stabliity furnished by 
these rules withdrawn and the fundamental con-
tracts, on which the oil business so largely rests, 
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be adjudged hy the Supreme Court to create 
mere rights in personalty at some uncertain date 
in the future, the structure of the business would 
be seriously, if not fatally, jeopardized." 
The decision in Callahan v. Ma,rtin, 43 P. (2d) 788, 
(Calif.), likewise holds that royalty interests are real 
property, but upon a different premise than the Texas 
view. rl,hus at page 791: 
"Some jurisdictions adhere to the theory that 
the owner of land has as estate in oil and gas 
beneath the surface in like manner as he has an 
estate in the surface; that oil and gas in place 
beneath the surface of land constitute a part of 
the land, and as such are real property, may be 
granted separate and apart from the surface, and 
when so granted vest in the assignee an estate in 
definite corporeal real property. This theory can-
not be better enlarged upon than by the following 
quotation from Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 
226, 176 S.W. 717, 719, 720, L.R.A. 1917F, 989: 
" 'It is no longer doubted that oil and gas 
within the ground are minerals. They have pecu-
liar attributes not common to other minerals be-
cause of their fugitive nature or vagrant habit-
the disposition to wonder or percolate, and the 
possibility of their escape from beneath one part 
of the surface of the earth to another. N everthe-
less, they are to be classed as minerals. (Citing 
authorities) In place, they lie within the strata 
of the earth, and necessarily are a part of the 
realty. Being a part of the realty while in place, 
it would seem to logically follow that, whenever 
they are conveyed while in that condition or pos-
sessing that status, a conveyance of an interest in 
the realty results. It is generally conceded that, 
for the purpose of ownership and conveyance of 
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solid 1ninerals the earth may be divided horizon-
tally as well ~s vertically, and that title to the 
surface n1ay rest in one person and title t~ the 
strata beneath the surface containing such miner-
als in another. * * * 
"'If they are in place beneath the tract, t~~y 
are essentially a part of the realty, and the1r 
grant, therefore, while in that condition, if effec-
tual at all, is a grant of an interest in the realty. 
* * * Their conveyance while in place, if the in-
strument be given any effect, is consequently the 
conveyance of an interest in the realty.' See, also, 
Stephens v. l\fid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 
160, 254 S.W. 290, 29 A.L.R. 566, note, 585; 
Leonard v. Prater (Tex. C01n. App.) 36 S.W. (2d) 
2161 86 A.L.R. 499, note, 506." 
The decision's reasoning turns to the early common 
law for analogy, and concludes that an oil royalty is a 
profit a prendre, and an estate in realty. At page 793, 
it states: 
"* * *Of the ancient incorporeal heredita-
ments listed by Blackstone, several either are not 
recognized at all in this country, or, if they do 
not involve rights in or to land, are not classed as 
things real. But a number of the common-law 
incorporeal hereditaments which involve rights 
connected with or pertaining to land persist, and 
are recognized generally as a species of interest 
in land, or estate in real property. (Citing authori-
ties.) 
"The incorporeal hereditament of common is 
defined by Blackstone as' being a profit which 
a man hath in the land of another; as to feed his' 
beasts, to catch fish, to dig turf, to cut wood or 
the like.' Cooley's Blackstone, supra, p. 455. These 
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are the rights which are described a.s profits a 
pendre, and they may be several as well as in com-
mon. See, discussion, 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 
1394." 
"Jurists writing since Blackstone's time have 
remarked that his inclusion of incorporeal here-
ditaments, together with lands and tenements, as 
"things, or objects in which don1inion or property 
may be had, is somewhat misleading. See 1 Tif-
fany, Real Property (2d Ed.) p. 9, note 27, citing 
Austin, Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) 371, 804; Digby, 
History Real Property (4th Ed.) 304, note; Hoh-
feld, 23 Yale Law Journal, p. 23; Salmond, Juris-
prudence (4th Ed.) 220. Where the incorporeal 
hereditmnent relates or pertains to land, it is, 
rather, a designation of a certain class of rights 
in and to land, just as an estate in fee simple 
absolute is the designation applied to the rights 
and interests of the person who has the fullest 
and most absolute estate in lands known to the 
law. That rights in and to land, though they are 
embraced within the definition of an incorporeal 
hereditament, constitute a limited interest or 
estate in land, is generally recognized. (See cases 
cited second paragraph above.) Where this 
limited interest is to endure in perpetuity or for 
life, it is a freehold interest, and real property or 
real estate, as well as an estate in real property." 
Again at page 795 : 
"The royalty return which the lessee renders 
to his lessor for this estate in the land is rent, or 
so closely analogous to rent as to partake of the 
incidents thereof. In the lease in the instant case, 
executed by Gonzales through his guardian, tihe 
lessor's oil royalty is referred to as 'rent or 
royalty.' In discussing the nature of landowner's 
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royalties, the Supreme Court.of the United States 
said in United States v. Noble, 237 U.S. 74, 35 
S. Ct. 532, 535, 59 L. Ed. 844 : 
" 'The rents and royalties were profit issuing 
out of the land. When they accrued, they became 
personal property; but rents and royalties to 
acrue were a part of the estate remaining in the 
lessor. As such, they would pas'S to his heirs, and 
not to his personal representatives. * * * 
" 'It is said that the leases contemplated the 
payment of surns of money, equal to the agreed 
percentage of the market value of the minerals, 
and thus that the assignment was of these 
moneys; but the fact that rent is to be paid in 
money does not make it any the less a profit 
issuing out of the land.' " 
At page 796: 
"* * * In this analysis, the assignee of an oil 
royalty not limited to the duration of a particular 
lease has a right in the nature of a profit a pendre 
in the land, and this right costitutes an interest in 
said land an estate in real property. * * *" 
See also Pa;yne v. Callahan, 99 P. (2d) 1050, (Calif.). 
In Arrington v. United Royalty, 65 S.W. (2d) 37: 
"We have held that leases given for a defi-
nite period in which exploration and discovery of 
the mineral might be made, to continue as long 
thereafter as oil and gas is produced conveys not 
merely a license but an interest and easement in 
the land itself. Standard Oil Co. v. Oil Well Sal-
vage Co., 170 Ark. 729, 281 S. W. 360; Clark v. 
Dep.nis, 172 Ark. 1096, 291 S. W. 887; Henry v. 
G~f Refining Co., 176 Ark. 133, 2 S.W. (2d) 687; 
and Henry v. Gulf Refining Co., 179 Ark. 138, 15 
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S.W. (2d) 979. As a consequence of this rule, our 
court has held that an attempted conveyance of 
the royalty reserved by parol is void, this, of 
course, being on the theory that the royalty was 
an interest in real estate." 
See also Marias R,iver Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 
38 P. (2d) 599, (Mont.); Mark v. Bradford, 23 N.W. (2d) 
205 (Mich.) . 
B. The Agreement (Exhibit C) between Appellant and 
Phebus and Stock from which the one-third of one 
per cent oil royalty in litigation must arise, termi-
nated by its own terms in January, 1934, as the 
condition on which the grant was to become effec-
tive, requiring Standard Oil Company, or one of 
its subsidiaries, to drill a well on the property in-
volved, was not pe1·formed. 
Exhibit C is the basic instrument from which any 
right or interest of respondents to the one-third of one 
per cent oil royalty must arise. When Phebus and Stock 
failed to perform the condition of such agreement and 
to drill a well as contemplated, no right ever vested in 
them so far as the one-third of one per cent royalty is 
concerned, since the agreement contemplated that they 
were to receive this royalty interest only if they per-
formed the condition and drilled such well within the 
time limitation set forth, and under the facts of this case, 
such time expired in January, 1934, long prior to the 
Equity Oil Company well in 1948. 
This instrument recites that appellant, among others, 
and Phebus and Stock were the owners of oil royalties 
in the lands described therein, and that it was desired 
to negotiate with a responsible oil production company 
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for the drilling of a deep te·st well on said ground which 
would not only test such land for oil, but would offer 
the possibility of further developing the gas production 
from the land to the benefit of the holders of gas royal-
ties in it, as gas was then being produced. The recitals 
also state that in order to perfect the drilling arrange-
ments, it was desirable to reduce the outstanding oil 
royalties. 
These recitals are an indication of the intention 
existing in the minds of the parties at the time this instru-
ment was executed. The agreement was to have a limited 
duration, not only because there was a desire to test for 
oil, but because gas was then being produced from the 
property and the parties desired to further develop the 
gas production for the benefit of the holders of the gas 
royalties. Certainly these gas royalty holders did not 
contemplate an increase in production some eighteen 
years later. In addition, there is a specific reference 
to a responsible oil company, which is later affirmatively 
identified as the Standard Oil Company of California, 
or one of its subsidiaries. As appellant testified, there 
had been a previous discovery of oil, although not in 
commercial quantities (T. 34), and he knew that Stand-
ard Oil Company was financially able and experienced in 
oil matters ( T. 26). In short, a specific drilling by this 
particular company within a limited time was in the 
minds of the parties. 
Turning to the body of this instrument, there next 
appears the consideration upon which the assignment of 
tlie oil royalty interest was based: 
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··NOW THEREFOR: in consideration of 
the premises of procuring the drilling of a deep 
test well on said land, for the consideration of 
One Dollar ( $1.00) and other valuable considera-
tions the undersigned parties of the first part, be-
ing the owners of the respective royalties inter-
ests as hereinafter set opposite their respective 
signatures, do hereby sell, assign and set over 
unto the parties of the second part One third Ya 
of their respective royalty interests in the oil 
produced and saved from said land." 
This language, when considered in connection with 
the balance of the agreernent, clearly shows that the con-
sideTation for the execution of this agreement was no-
thing more or less than the drilling of an oil well. The fact 
that there is a recital with reference to the payment of 
$1.00 does not in any way change the real consideration, 
and, in fact, the dollar is obviously purely nominal, as 
it does not bear any reasonable relationship to the values 
with which the instrument was concerned. Further, evi-
dence relative to such intent of the parties is clear from 
the fact that appellant never received such amount. Proof 
of this fact was Inade by tender, (T. 16, 17), and the re-
fusal of the Trial Court to accept such tender has else-
where been assigned as error. A similar situation arose 
in People's Gas Co. v. Dean, 193 F. 938, (C.C.A. 8, 1911). 
In that case the Court pointed out that under a some-
what similar agreement the real and only consideration 
was the drilling of a well. The reasoning of the opinion 
is well set forth at page 942 a:s follows. 
"When we come to examine the lease or con-
tract under consideration, we think it perfectly 
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clear that it was made for the purpose o! expl~r­
ing and developing the land for gas ~~ oll. Whil_e 
the consideration was primarily $1, 1t 1s very evi-
dent from the terms of the contract that the pros-
p~ctive benefits and profits from gas and oil were 
the real and vital considerations moving the con-
tracting parties. As was said by the Supreme 
Court of Indiana, in the case of Hancock v. Dia-
mond Plate Glass Co., 37 Ind. App. 351, 75 N.E. 
659: 
" 'To the landowner the manifest inducement 
was the rent and royalties he expected to enjoy 
if the gas company should find gas or oil in pay-
ing quantities; to the gas company the right to ex-
clude others from the preinises it should drill. It 
will not do to believe that the landowner would for 
the pittance of 50 cents per acre per annum have 
knowingly incumbered his land, situate in the gas 
district, and thereby reduced its selling value by 
transferring, for an indefinite period, and for 
speculative purposes, the right to enter at the 
pleasure of the grantee or his assignee and mine 
the underlying gas or oil, or that he would have 
bargained away his prospects for large gains from 
the gas and oil under his land, with the knowl-
edge that the same would be extracted through 
wells on other premises, and that his profits would 
be limited to the annual acreage rent during the 
process of extraction.'" 
See: 
Shelden v. Bright, 10 P. (2d) 831, (Kans.); 
17 C.J.S. 475, Sec.128. 
The balance of the instrument continues (typo-
graphical errors appear in exhibit). 
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"IT IS EXPRESSTY UNDERSTOOD AND 
AGREED That this assignment does not apply 
to the royalty interests of said parties of th~ first 
part in gas produced from said land. This as-
signment is made for the purpose of procuring 
the drilling of a well to test the said land for oil 
under the agree1nent between the said Paul Stock 
and Ray Phebus on the one part and the Sta,ndard 
oil company of California andjor one of its sub-
sidiaries, on the other part, hereinafter designated 
as the operating Company. If the negotiations of 
the said Pa~tl Stock and Ray pheb1.ts shall result in 
the drilling, withirn the limitations hereinafter pro-
vided of a test well upon the Ashley Valley Struc-
ture to the depth of th,e pennsylvanian formation 
or to such lesser debth as shall produce oil in 
commercial quantities, then this assignment shall 
be at full force and effect a,s to the oil royalties 
hereinafter set forth. It is understood that the 
limitations above reffered to are as follows, the 
said operation company is to commence said well 
on the Ashley Valley structure within six months 
after the completion of the deep test well whoch 
shall first be drilled on the Rangley structure in 
Northwestern Colorado, said well on the Rangley 
structure shall be con1mences as soon hereafter 
as weather conditions will permit and not later 
than the summer of 1931. after the commence-
lnent if each of the said wells, the drilling opera-
tions shall be presented with reasonable diligence. 
If said test well upon the Ashley Valley structure 
shall not be drilled as herein contemplated, then in 
that event the parties of the second part hereby 
agree to reconv~y the royalty interests herein 
assigned to them to the respective parties of the 
first part. In Witness whereof we have hereunto 
set our hands and set opposite our respective 
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names the presentage of royalty interes~ affe~ted 
by this agreement and have caused th1s assign-
ment of One third lj3 thereof to be executed." 
Again reference is made to the purpose of the agree-
ment to procure a well "under the agreement between 
the said Paul Stock and Ray Phebus on the one part and 
the Standard Oil Company of California and/ or one of 
its subsidiaries, on the other part". There was therefore 
in existance an agreement with Standard Oil, and the 
parties were not attempting to develop the property with 
any oil company which would drill, or in a general way, 
but under a specific agreement which required only for 
final completion of the reduction of royalties outstanding 
from 18lj2 % to 12¥2%. The agree1nent then provides 
that IF this well is drilled, THEN the assignment shall 
be at full force and effect. Thereafter appear the limita-
tions referred to which place a definite time limit upon 
the performance of the well drilling. The intent is ob-
vious. Unless the well is drilled, no interest in the frac-
tional oil royalty is to pass or remain in Phebus and 
Stock, and it seems perfectly obvious that this instrument 
by its terms is self executing. Whether the royalty inter-
est ever passed, and it seems rrwst logical that in fact 
it never did pass until the condition wa·s performed, or 
whether it did pass under the control limitation of the 
condition makes little difference. In either event, no 
right, title and interest vested because of the expiration 
of the time period since the record is clear that no well 
at all was ever drilled upon this ground by Standard Oil 
Company or any of its subsidiaries, within the time 
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period conteinplated or at all. 
At the end of the agreement appears a covenant that 
Phebus and Stock agree to reconvey if the test well on 
the Ashley Valley "shall not be drilled as herein contem-
plated." ~~his is in one sense surplusage, and does not 
conflict with the clear intent of the parties expressed 
above. It is completely logical and consistent, however. 
The interest here involved was viewed generally as an 
interest in real property, and in fact every instrument 
in this record was recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder in the same fashion that any standard deed 
would be recorded. This rneant that the agreement was 
a matter of public record. Whether or not this well was 
ever drilled might be a fact within the knowledge of the 
parties, but in the event that they late:r: desired to exe-
cute a conveyance of their royalty interest there would 
remain a factual question which would require clarifica-
tion on the record, a typical cloud on title. It is entirely 
logical that the agreement make provision for such neces-
sity should it ever arise, but it certainly did not alter 
and literally change the entire agreement and render the 
inclusion of the words IF and THEN meaningless. It 
was an ancillary afterthought, and since appellant in 
the instant case has never conveyed his interest nor at-
tempted to do so, there has been no particular reason to 
demand reconveyance. He did demand a recognition of 
his interest, of course, when he discovered in 1948 that 
his ownership of the entire 1% royalty was questioned, 
and every page of the record of his testimony both subse-
quent to this time, and later, shows clearly his proper 
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conviction that because of the time limit expiration of 
the well drilling clause in 1934 he owned the royalty in 
its entirety. The clause does not require any affirmative 
act on the part of appellant such as demand, and is an 
express covenant without qualification to reconvey. Re-
spondents entire position in this controversy is based up-
on the premise that they are entitled to take advantage 
of their own wilful breach of this covenant. 
In general, one dominant fact of this agreement is of 
particular importance. While it extends to Phebus and 
Stock the right to secure permanently the one-third royal-
ty interest by the act of completing the test well within 
the time limitations, which was six months after comple-
tion of the Rangely well, or early 1934, it does not compel 
them to take any action whatsoever in this regard. They 
suffer no loss or detriment, and there was no remedy 
or right in the grantors in the event the well was not 
drilled as agreed. As the cases hereinafter cited point 
out, this i'S a typical unilateral agreement and in reality 
nothing more than a specie of simple option, wherein the 
rights in the optionees Phebus and Stock matured only 
in the event they fulfilled the terms of acceptance. 
The general rule of construction in oil and gas con-
tracts and agreements is that they are to be construed 
strictly against the lessee or grantee and in favor of the 
individual making the grant. In some respects the rule 
is somewhat different than that applied to ordinary con-
tract because of the highly speculative nature of the prop-
erty involved. It will be noted moreover, that appellant 
did not prepare or cause the agreement to be prepared 
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(T. 15), and in fact had not seen it prior to the day of ex-
ecution, at which tirne other parties had already affixed 
their signatures (Exhibit C). The cases indicate that the 
agreement should be construed, therefore, liberally in 
favor of the appellant. 
In Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F. (2d) 
299 (C.C.A. 9) the rule is set forth at page 300: 
"Oil and gas leases deal with property of a 
highly speculative nature, and the protection of 
the interests of the lessor is considered of para-
mount importance. In Solberg v. Sunburst Oil 
Company, 76 Mont. 254, 246 P. 168, it is declared 
that (page 172) 'the well-known rules of construc-
tion of contracts, have in case of oil and gas leases, 
been modified to meet the new conditions arising 
by reason of the new industry, and such modifica-
tion is necessary for the protection of the inter-
ests of the landowner and of the public generally.' 
The Montana courts have consistently declared 
that in connection with such leases frofeitures are 
favored by the law. 'Defendants argue that the 
courts view forfeitures with disfavor and will en-
force thern only when the strict letter of the con-
tract requires it. This is a correct statement of a 
general principle of law, but in connection with oil 
and gas leases, forfeitures are favored by the law.' 
Berthelote et al v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 
P. 2d 187, 190. 'It is a recognized doctrine in this 
court that oil and gas leases are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the lessor and strictly against 
the lessee.' McDaniel v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co., 
75 Mont. 356, 366, 243 P. 582, 586. Other cases 
dealing with the gen~ral subject are cited on the 
margrn. 
"The rule in vogue is not merely to the effect 
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that express provisions for forfeiture wi~l he 
strictly enforced. An implied right of forfeiture 
will be enforced with equal strictness." 
In Hill v. Sta.m.olind Oil & Gas Co., 205 P. 2d 643 
(Colo.) at page 649: 
"Among the rules for construction of a lease 
are the following: That it should be construed if 
possible so as to give effect to every provision con-
tained in it; that it should be so construed as best 
to promote production, development and prog-
ress; Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 
51 W. Va. 583, 42 S.E. 655, 59 L.R.A. 566; that 
it should be construed in favor of the lessor and 
against the lessee; that, tv hen cont1·acts are op-
tional in respect to one party, they are strictly 
construed in favor of the party that is bound and 
against the party that is not bound; Lewis v. 
Grininger, 198 Okl. 419, 179 P. 2d 463." 
.. Lewis v. Grininger, 179 P. 2d 463 (Okla.) involved 
the construction of an oil and ga:s lease and contains an 
indication of the practical application of the foregoing 
rule of construction. Paragraph five of the lease con-
tained the following provision: 
" 'If operations for the drilling of a well for 
oil and gas are not commenced on the land hereby 
leased on or before Dec. 25, 1942, this lease shall 
terminate as to both parties, unless the lessee 
shall on or before Dec. 25, 1942, pay or tender to 
the lessor * * * the sum of One Hundred Sixty 
Dollars which shall operate as a rental and cover 
the privilege of deferring the commencement of 
drilling operations on the land hereby leased for a 
period of twelve months. • • ""'" 
Paragraph 15 of the lease was in conflict. 
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.. 'It is agreed that neglect or failure to pay 
rentals when due shall not operate to forfeit or 
cancel this lease, until lessor gives lessee notice 
by registered mail of said failure to pay rental; 
whereupon lessee shall pay same within 10 days 
of receipt of said registered letter, or this lease 
is void.' " 
In holding that the lease had in fact terminated, the 
court stated, at page 464: 
"Paragraph fifteen is in conflict with para-
graph five and indefinite in its terms. It would 
extend the lease for a period of at least ten days 
beyond the term of twelve months as provided in 
paragraph five without payment of any sum to 
lessor, and for such further indefinite and uncer-
tain length of time until lessee should receive by 
registered mail a notice by lessor of lessee's fail-
ure to pay, and then at the option of lessee to ex-
pire by its terms unless lessee chose to make pay-
ment. This uncertainty and indefiniteness is made 
more apparent in the light of the facts in this case. 
The lease was made to Sungold Syndicate No. 
Two without showing any address of lessee and 
the assignment of the lease to defendant was not 
filed on record for more than two years after exe-
cution of the lease. 
"The rules of construction applicable to this 
lease are stated in Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas 
& Oil Co., et al., 29 Okl. 719, 119 P. 260, 43 L.R.A., 
N.S., 487, where in the third and fourth para-
graphs of the syllabus it is said: 
'A different rule of construction obtains 
as to oil and ga:s leases from that applied to 
ordinary leases or to other mining leases. 
Owing to the peculiar nature of the mineral, 
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----·~= 
and the danger of loss to the· owner from 
drainage by surrounding wells, such leases 
are construed most st.rongly against the 
lessee and in favor of the lessor. 
'When contracts are optiorwl ·in respect 
to one party they are strictly construed im 
favor of the party that is bound and against 
the party that is not bound.' 
"Under the provisions of paragraph five the 
lease had terminated before the provisions of 
paragraph fifteen could becon1e operative. 
"If paragraph fifteen was effective for any 
purpose, it was not effective to prevent termina-
tion of the lease under paragraph five above 
quoted." 
The agreement here involved is substantially what 
has been described as the "unless" lease in cases involv-
ing oil litigation. The distinguishing characteristic of 
such a lease is that the grantee or lessee is under no ob-
ligation to affirmatively perform any act whether it be 
that of drilling a well or paying rent, it is unilateral in 
nature, and essentially a specie of option. Under this 
type of agreement, no right vests until there has been a 
performance of the condition. This is substantially iden-
tical with the agreement here involved, as Phebus and 
Stock did not covenant to perform any act either by way 
of rental payment or drilling, there was no right in 
Preas of any kind to compell them to drill the well on 
the Ashley Valley Structure and no remedy if they failed 
to do .so. 
In Summ.ers Oil and Gas, Permanent Edition, Vol. 2, 
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Sec. 452, page 494, appears a summary of the "unless': 
lease characteristics, and the distinction between that 
lease and an "or' lease which reads as follows: 
"'When the "unless" drilling clause is used, 
the lessee does not covenant to drill or pay. The 
clause relative to the drilling of wells within a 
stated time, or the periodic payment of money is 
used, not for the purpose of fixing a duty upon 
the lessee to drill or pay, but to state a limitation 
upon which the lease terminates if these acts are 
not perforwed. Consequently, if the lessee fails 
to drill within the st,ipulated time, the lessor can-
not recover in an action for rent, or recover in an 
action for damages for. failure to drill, for the ob-
vious reason that there is no duty on which to 
found such actions. 
"'Where the "drill or pay" clause is used, the 
courts uniformly hold that the interest of the 
lessee is subject to be defeated by breach of con-
dition subsequent; that is, the failure of the lessee 
to drill or pay within the time or times stipulated 
in the lease. This power to forfeit the lease is for 
the benefit of and exercisable by the lessor or his 
assigns only. Before the lease is terminated by 
this power, there must be a declaration of forfeit-
ure by the lessor and a perfection thereof, by re-
entry, action or other operative act. 
" 'But where the "unless" drilling clause is 
used, the failure of the lessee to drill or pay a 
stipulated sum of money ipso facto terminates the 
lease without the necessity of re-entry, action, or 
their equivalents by the lessor.' (Citing Gloyd v. 
Mid-West Refining Compa,ny, supra.) 'For this 
reason the interest created by the lessee by such 
lease cannot be one terminable by breach of con-
ditions subsequent. Some courts have designated 
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them options or optional leases but the interests 
created by them are perhaps b~tter classif~ed as 
estates upon common law limitatio~, whereii_l the 
interest of the grantee or lessee continues unt~l the 
happening of the event upon which they terminate 
* * * Some courts have held that the interest ere .. 
ated by this sort of lease is one on common law 
limitation. 
"'If the interest created by the "unless" lease 
is classed as an interest upon common law or spe-
cial limitation, it is difficult to see how the termi-
nation by failure of the lessee to drill wells or to 
pay the sums stipulated therein for the continu-
ance of his privilege of drillings, can be accurately 
termed a forfeiture, or a decree of a court of 
equity cancelling such a lease or quieting the les-
sor'·s title in respect to it, th~ enforcement of a 
forfeiture. But whether this terminology be final-
ly accepted by the courts to designate the nature 
of the interest of the lessee, they nevertheless 
agree that the lease autmnatically terminates by 
its own terms without the exercise of any power 
on the part of the lessor, and this prevents the 
interest from being one subject to be defeated by 
conditions subsequent, the enforcement of which 
is so thoroughly abhorred by courts of equity. It 
is no doubt true that, where an "unless" lease has 
terminated for the failure of the lessee to drill 
test wells or to pay delay rentals within time or 
times stipulated, the lessor has a right to have 
the cloud thereof removed from his title. * * *'" 
Gloyd v. Midwest Refining Co., 62 F. 2d 483 ( C.C.A. 
10) defines an unless lease as follows: 
"Under an 'or' lease the lessee is obligated 
either to drill a well or pay rental and the failure 
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• 
where the lessee makes default in the payment of 
rental the lessor may waive the default and re-
cover such rental. ( Citations) 
"But under an 'unless' lease the lessee is not 
obligated either to cmnmence a well or pay rental. 
Until a well has been drilled and oil or gas pro-
duced, such a lease is terminable at the will of the 
lessee, and where no well has been commenced 
such a lease automatically terminates upon the 
intentional failure of the lessee to pay the stipu-
lated rental within the time provided in the lease. 
(Citations)." 
"The weight of authority is to the effect that 
an 'unless' lease, until the lessee has gone into 
possession, drilled a well, and commenced the pro-
duction of oil or gas from the leased premises, con-
veys no vested interest in the land itself and is 
oni'y an option to go upon the land and explore 
for oil and gas. (Citations) But when the lessee 
has gone upon the premises, completed a well, and 
produced oil or gas therefrom, he then acquires a 
vested interest for the term of the lease and be-
comes bound by all the covenants of the lease, ex-
press and implied. (Citations)." 
In Bowes v. Republic Oil Company, 252 P. 800 
(Mont.), at page 802: 
"It is the plain intention of the parties and 
not the mere wording of a lease which fixes its 
nature as an 'or' lease or an 'unless' lease, as de-
fined in McDaniels v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co., 
75 Mont. 356, 243 P. 582. In this connection it 
must be remembered tha.t such lea.ses as this are 
executed for the purpose of having lands explored, 
tested, and drilled to determine whether oil and 
gas may be found therein, and, therefore, to the 
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••• 
end that development may be promoted and delay:J 
therein prevented (New State Oil Co. v. Dunn, 75 
Okl. 141, 182 P. 514), they are to b.e constr7!'ed 
liberally in favor of the lessor and stnctly agatnst 
the lessee. (Citations). 
"While forfeitures are not usually favored in 
the law, owing to the peculiar nature of oil and 
gas leases, forfeitures are here favored rather 
than frowned upon. (Citations). 
"Reading the lease under consideration in the 
light of the foregoing special rules of construc-
tion, we are of the opinion that, while it does not 
conform to any of the known forn1s of oil and gas 
leases and does contain the phrases 'grant, demise, 
lease and let' and 'covenant and agree,' it in fact 
goes no further than to grant to lessee the privi-
lege of drilling or not drilling at its option andre-
quires the lessee to do nothing, and, if drilling is 
commenced, the lessee is required to prosecute 
such operations to completion with diligence. In 
all essential features this lease is analogous to the 
one under consideration in McDaniels v. Hager-
Stevenson Oil Co., above. It is true that it does 
not contain the clause 'unless' the lessee pay 
rent, but it does provide that the lease shall be 
null and void unless the lessee sees fit to com-
mence operations within the time limit and con-
tinue those operations with diligence until gas or 
oil is discovered in paying quantities or the re-
quired depth is reached, and does not require the 
lessee to do either of these things. It falls, then, 
within the category of the 'unless' form of lease, 
which terminates ipso facto on failure to exercise 
the option granted and under which no affirmative 
action is required of the lessor. It is therefore im-
. material that the lessor took no action to declare 
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a forfeiture before bringing his action, as the lease 
automatically e1~pired long prior to the commence-
ment of the action. Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas 
Co., 76 Mont. 354, 246 P. 168." 
The decision in Empire Gas and Fuel Company v. 
Sawnders, 22 F. 2d 733 ·( C.C.A. 5) states at page 735: 
"The lease under consideration provides that, 
if drilling is not begun within one year from its 
date, the rights of the lessee shall terminate, un-
less the lessee keeps it alive by making the pay-
ments of rent. It makes time the essence of the 
contract. r_rhe lessee is not obligated to do any-
thing, but, if it fails either to drill wells or to make 
the payments of rent as and when due, its rights 
and privileges are at an end. The lessor was un-
der no duty to notify the lessee of a failure to 
pay the correct amount due as rent, and had the 
right to remain silent. Under these circumstances, 
the lessee could not rely on the lessor's silence." 
See also Clovis v. Carson Oil & Gas Co., 11 F. Sup. 
797 (D.C.E.D. Mich.); McCrabb v. Moulton, 124 F. 2d 
689 (C.C.A. 8); McDaniel v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co., 
243 P. 582, 585 (Mont.); Guerra v. Chancellor, 103 S.W. 
2d 775 (Tex.); Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed., 
Vol.10, Sec. 5570; Williams v. Ware, 31 P. 2d 567 (Okla.), 
holding that an unless lease is a unilateral option. 
Tlie word "unless" does not actually appear in the 
language of this agreement, but the word is defined in 
the New Century Dictionary as "if it be not ... that", or 
"if ... not." The agreement states, "If the negotiations 
... shall result in the drilling ... then this assignment 
shall be at full force and effect." The obvious paraphrase 
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'" '~~ •• ~..__....., ____ ~----...·,1 
is that the assignment shall not become effective unless 
the well is drilled. 
As has been detailed above, an oil royalty interest 
of the type involved in this litigation is an interest in real 
property. In Callahan v. Martin, 43 P. (2d) 788, supra, 
the California court turned to the common law for an 
analogy upon which to determine the nature of an oil 
royalty. We believe such analogy is likewise of assistance 
in this case, and that the agreement between Appellant 
and Phebus and Stock is a typical illustration of the 
common law condition precedent wherein the rights of 
grant do not actually arise until such time as there has 
been a full compliance with the conditions. In the vari-
ous constructions of the oil and gas agreements, which 
have been set forth above, there are references to this 
condition precedent. A definition is found in 12 C. J. 407, 
which reads as follows: 
"Condition Precedent. (Par. 1) A. In Gen-
eral. One which is to be performed before some 
right dependent thereon is performed; one which 
must be performed before the interest affected by 
it can vest; one that must happen before the estate. 
dependent upon it can arise or be enlarged; one 
that must happen or be performed before the es-
tate can vest or be enlarged. In contracts, a condi-
tion which calls for the perfonnance of some act 
or the happening of some event after the terms of 
the contract have been agreed upon, before the 
contract shall take effect; that is to say, the con-
tract is made in form, but does not become opera-
tive as a contract until some future specified act 
is performed, or some subsequent event occurs. 
It seems to be agreed that in regard to all condi-
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tions whether in a deed or will or in simple con-
tracts, where the condition is in the nature of 
a consideration for the concession, its perform-
ance will be regarded as in tended to precede the 
vesting of any right, and so a condition precedent. 
A condition precedent implies an existing fact, or 
state of facts, which must be so changed as to 
bring it into a condition desired. A condition 
which involves anything in the na.ture of a. consid-
eration is, in general, a condition precedent." 
We may cite two additional cases which deal in gen-
eral with the type of agreement of concern and character-
ize the perfonnance of the drilling as a condition pre-
cedent. Thus in Ellison v. Skelly Oil Co., 244 P. (2d) 832, 
(Okla.), the Court states at page 836: 
"In Gillespie v. Bobo, 271 F. 641, 644, con-
cerning an 'unless' lease there involved, the Fed-
eral Fifth Circuit Court said: 'Such instruments 
as the one in question have been passed on fre-
quently by the courts of Texas. It is well settled 
by the decisions of those courts that such an in-
strument confers on the so-called lessee a privi-
lege for the specified time, with the option to se-
cure the extension of the privilege for an addi-
tional period upon complying with the prescribed 
condition, and that time is of the essence of such a 
provision as the one above set out. Ford v. Bar-
ton (Tex. Civ. App.) 224 S.W. 268; Bailey v. Wil-
liams (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S.W. 311; Young v. 
Jones (Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S.W. 691; Ford v. 
Cochran (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S.W. 1041. The 
equitable rule as to relieving against forfeiture8 
has no application to the case of a failure of a 
holder of an option to do, within the time fixed, 
what is required to acquire the thing which is the 
subject of the option. Equity does not undertake 
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to dispense with compliance u·,ith what is tna~e a 
condition precedent to the acquisition of a nght. 
(citing authorities)" 
Again in Williams v. Ware, 31 P. (2d) 567, at page 
569: 
"Quoting from the case of Brennan v. Hun-
ter, 68 Old. 112, 172 P. 49, which is referred to by 
this court with approval in the case of Garfield 
Oil Company v. Champlin, 78 Old. 91, 189 P. 514, 
520, the court said : 
"'The lease in the instant case explains fully 
the nature and extent of the interest passed to the 
lessee; that is, the lessor grants, demises, leases, 
and lets unto the lessee for the sole and only pur-
pose of mining and operating for oil and gas and 
of laying pipe lines and of building tanks, towers, 
stations, and structures thereon to produce, save, 
and take care of said products. The lease by its 
express terms would terminate unless a well was 
completed on the land on or before August 23, 
1916. The rental provision granted an option to 
the lessee; that is, that by the payJnent of the 
rentals the time for completing the well would be 
extended another six months. It is immaterial 
whether that provision be regarded as an option 
to renew the lease, or extend the tern1s, or to con-
tinue the lease in force, or defer completion of a 
well, or to extend the time for performance of the 
condition to cmnplete a well. The payment of the 
rerttals specified on or before Augu.st 23, 1916, 
was a condition precedent to such renewal exten-
sion, or continuance of the lease, or deferring com-
pletion, or extension of the ti1ne to perform the 
condition to complete a well. When the option 
was not exercised, the lease, according to its ex-
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cause no well was completed on or before that 
date. The lessee did not agree to pay said sum, 
and this cannot be called a case of forfeiture in-
curred for breach of a covenant to pay money, or 
any other covenant. Up to the 23rd of August, 
1916, the lease was unilateral to this extent: The 
lessee could pay or not pay the rentals, and, if he 
did not pay, he would not be liable to the lessor 
for the same. When the lessee failed to exercise 
the option to extend the time, the situation became 
the same as though no provision for extending 
the time had been in corpora ted in the lease. The 
defendant, failing to exercise its option or privi-
lege, its rights are governed solely by the clause 
providing that the lease should re1nain in force 
for a ter1n of five years from date, and if no well 
was completed on said land on or before the 23rd 
of August, 1916, the lease would tenninate as to 
both parties. It has been held by a long line of 
decisions of this court that an "unless" lease, such 
as is here involved, is a unilateral option.'" 
The analogy to the common law condition precedent 
is obvious. The language states that IF a well is drilled 
in accordance with the specifications of the agreement, 
both as to time and the Company to perform the drilling, 
"then this assignment shall be at full force and effect 
as to the oil royalties hereinafter set forth." This clearly 
can mean only that there was no interest which could 
vest in Phebus and Stock until this well was drilled as 
contemplated. Any other construction necessarily ig-
nores the plain language of the agreement and the ob-
vious intent of the parties in this regard. The language 
ties directly with the common law definition of a condi-
tion precedent, which is simply a condition to be per-
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formed before a right dependent thereon is acquired, ot 
the estate dependent upon it can arise or be enlarged. 
A further test of the intent of the parties is found in the 
fact that at no time has Appellant acquired any right of 
action whatsoever for damages or injury in the event the 
well was not drilled. This is a typical condition precedent 
as conceived by the con1mon law, and under such concep-
tion failure to perform the condition has the effect of pre-
venting any interest from vesting. This is obviously what 
transpired in the instant case. 
C. Claim based on agreement has been abandoned. 
As the above citations have indicated, the Courts 
have uniformly expressed a concern with the necessity 
of so construing oil agreements as to expedite drilling 
and development of the resources of the various states. 
The agreement contemplates two wells, one on the 
Rangely structure, and the other on this property on the 
Ashley Valley structure. The first, and Rangely deep 
test well, was completed on July 31, 1933, and the time 
limitations of Exhibit C required the commencement of 
drilling on the Ashley Valley structure on January 31, 
1934. This well was not drilled. The agreements which 
had been executed with Standard Oil and its subsidiary, 
The California Company, were by the latter reassigned 
on March 21, 1943, (Exhibit H), with a recital that the 
California Company "had elected not to commence the 
drilling of a test well on the Ashley 'Talley structure." 
From that date, for year after year, the land was vacant 
and there was no oil drilling of any kind by any Company 
until the year 1948, when Equity Oil Company spudded 
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in its well. '_rhis is a period of fourteen years, which is 
scarcely the activity contemplated, and for which these 
royalty holders were willing to relinquish one-third of 
their royalties. The background compels the conclusion 
that time was of the essence. Gas was being produced in 
1930 and oil had been discovered on the premises prior 
to that time according to the testimony of appellant. This 
simply means that although there had never been com-
mercial production of oil, there was every indication to 
believe that oil would in fact be found. To secure that de-
velopment within a relatively short period of time appel-
lant was willing to forego a one-third royalty, and there 
is no other premise upon which there is any explanation 
for the meticulous detail of the condition which was in-
serted in this agreement. 
The conclusion is obvious and the fact of abandon-
ment clear from this record. Not only did Phebus and 
Stock fail to perform the condition set forth in the agree-
ment, but both themselves and the other respondents 
herein knew that such condition had not been performed. 
The agreement was abandoned in its entirety following 
.January, 1934. 
Abandonment is well known in oil and gas law. As 
the Court stated in Rehard v. Klossner, 119 P. (2d) 145, 
pages 147, 148: 
"The trial court found that there had been no 
drilling on the leased lands for more than two 
years and that defendant had failed to pay the 
rentals. Tliese findings show an abandonment of 
the lease and the leased property sufficient to sup-
port the judgment. 
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"In the case of Hall v. Augur, 82 Cal. App. :19-!, 
256 P. 232, 234, the oil lease in question there was 
dated May 5 1921 and became effective not later 
than May 30,' 1921.' rrhere was no forfei~ure ~lause 
in the lease. The suit to quiet title agarnst rt was 
filed on May 22, 1922, as no drilling operations 
had been started. In holding that there had been 
an abandonment, the court said: 
"'Abandonment will be more readily found in 
the case of oil and gas leases than in most other 
cases. In Harris v. Riggs, 63 Ind. App. 201, 112 
N.E. 36, it is said: "Such a lease may be aban-
doned, and when once abandoned by the lessee, 
he cannot thereafter claim or enforce any right 
thereunder without first securing the consent of 
the lessor or a renewal of the lease. (Citing au-
thorities) 
"'"It has been held and supported by sound 
reason that abandonment may be rnore readily 
found in cases of oil and gas leases than in most 
other instances. The rights granted under such 
leases are for exploration and development. The 
title or interest granted is inchoate until oil or gas 
is found in quantities warranting operation, and 
courts will not permit the lessee to fail in develop-
ment and hold the lease for speculative or other 
purposes, except in strict compliance with his 
contract for a valuable and sufficient considera-
tion other than such development. (Citing author· 
ities)" 
" 'We believe the evidence was sufficient to 
support the finding of fact by the trial court that 
the defendants abandoned whatever right title, 
or interest they or either of them, had in ~nd to 
such lease prior to the assignment of said lease 
to the Interstate Oil Corporation.' (Citations)" 
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D. The statute of limitations did not constitute a de-
fense, because such statute does not apply to an 
action in the nature of quiet title to remove a cloud, 
and the action could not in any event arise until 
Nov-ember, 1948, one year and six months prior to 
time action was commenced on May 16, 1950. 
In the first place, the Court has misconstrued the 
clear intent of the parties as expressed in Exhibit C. As 
we have pointed out in detail above, no right was vested 
in Phebus or Stock until such time as they had performed 
this condition, and since it was never performed, no right 
under this Exhibit ever matured. None of the affirma-
tive defenses asserted by respondents have any applica-
tion, and this is true of the one defense upon which the 
Trial Court apparently based its decision, which was the 
statute of lirnitations. 
Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law, (R. 41), 
states that appellant's cause of action accrued on or about 
January 1, 1934, which was six months after the comple-
tion of the deep test well on the Rangely structure in 
Colorado, which had been completed on July 1, 1933. 
Paragraph 4 of such Conclusions, (R. 41), then goes 
on to find that the action is one upon a contract or obli-
gation founded upon an instrument in writing, and was, 
therefore, barred within six years from the date of the 
accrual of the cause of action under the provisions of 
the Utah statute of limitations set forth in Title 78, Chap-
ter 12, Section 23, subsection 2. In these Conclusions of 
Law it is apparent that the Trial Court has not only mis-
construed the essential nature of this action, which is to 
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remove a cloud and quiet title, but it has likewise failed 
to properly establish the time at which a cause of action 
arose. 
This action did not arise, and appellant was notre-
quired to take any affirmative action, until such time as 
he was aware that an adverse claim existed. It is clear 
from the record that appellant had no conception of the 
fact that there was a claim to his one-third of one percent 
royalty interest until he first saw the endorsement on 
the royalty check received from Equity Oil Company in 
November, 1948. His actions are consistent wth such be. 
lief, and, in fact, at this time he was not sure that such a 
claim existed, but felt the necessity of attempting to de-
termine such fact because of the unusual wording of the 
endorsement on the royalty check. He immediately at-
tempted to contact Stock, discussed the matter with Phe-
bus and finally wrote a letter to Stock requesting clari-
fication and a determination as to whether or not, in fact, 
there was an adverse claim. Prior to the receipt of such 
check from Equity Oil Company his entire conduct indi-
cated that he had no idea of any claim existing after the 
year 1934 and the failure of performance of the condi-
tion contained in Exhibit C. 
The Court, moreover, has failed to properly analyze 
the action as one to remove cloud and quiet title. In such 
event, the statute of limitations does not apply as the 
cloud is deemed to exist at all times until it is, in fact, 
removed either by voluntary action of a party or court 
decree. In this connection we should point out that all of 
the cases hereinabove cited which analyze and deal wit~ 
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the "unless" type of agreement are basically actions to 
quiet title. 
In the case of Hudson v. Smith, 41 P. (2d) 861, 
(Okla.), the court states : 
"We know of no statute in this state that bars 
the plaintiff's action. The defendants claim that 
since the deed was executed in 1919, and suit not 
commenced until 1933, the action is barred. The 
statute could not commence to run until plaintiff 
became aware of a hostile claim, or a disptde as 
to his interest. The petition alleges that no hos-
tile claim arose until less than one year prior to 
the commencement of the action. The plaintiff's 
right to an equitable adjudication of his title was 
a continuing one, and no statute of limitations 
could commence running until an adverse cla.im 
arose. Robertson v. Battles, 97 Okl. 54, 221 P. 
1002." (page 864) 
In Luker v. Anderson, 10 S.W. (2d) 149, the Court 
stated at page 150: 
"The contention of appellant that appellee's 
cause of action was barred by the statute of limit-
ations must be overruled. The injury from a cloud 
on title is continuing, and the cause of action for 
its removal is likewise continuing and never bar-
red while the cloud exists. Texas Co. v. Davis, 
113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304, 255 S.W. 601." 
See 17 R.C.L. 715, paragraph 71, page 715: 
"Action to quiet title -A cloud upon a title 
is considered as continuing to operate during the 
period of its existence and, therefore, the right 
to maintain an action to remove a cloud from a 
title is a continuing one to which the statute of 
limitations is not applicable." 
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Skelly Oil Co. v. Wickham, 202 F. (:2d) -±42 
C.C.A.lO); 
Superior Oil Co. v. Jackson, 250 P. (2d) 23 
(Okla.); 
Mark v. Bradford, 23 N.W. (2d) 205, (Mich.) 
In this connection also we direct the. Court's at. 
tention to paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law, (R. 
41), wherein the Court holds that plaintiff's action, jj 
any, is in personam, and apparently ties this to its con. 
elusion relative to the statute of limitations. What haE 
been said above would apply both to an action in per. 
sonam or an action in rem. We believe, however, that 
this is a fun dam en tal error on the part of the Court. 
This would seem to imply that the Court viewed the con-
ditions and limitations of Exhibit C as a specie of cove-
nant rather than as a condition. A covenant is well known 
in law, and must necessarily involve an agreement to do 
or refrain from doing an act. A condition, on the other 
hand, is simply an event which may occur and as the re-
sult of which a legal right is lost or acquired. Under 
Exhibit C there was no requirement that Preas or Phebus 
drill or not drill. They were free to do as they desired, 
and clearly this is not a covenant. On the other hand, it is 
a typical condition, in that if Standard Oil Company, 
or its subsidiary, drilled a well on the property within the 
· limited time specified, then and only then respondents 
would have acquired the right in question. 
POINT III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
MAKING AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT, THE 
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Two particular Findings of Fact indicate that the 
Court has misconstrued the evidence. Paragraph 4 of 
such Findings, ( R. 39), reads as follows : 
"That on October 11, 1930 the plaintiff, for 
a valuable consideration, assigned, conveyed and 
set over unto the defendants Paul Stock and Ray 
Phebus one-third of all his right, title and interest 
in and to said oil royalty interest, except as the 
same pertains to the NElJt of the SE1;4 of said 
Section 15, with the express understanding and 
agreement that the said Stock and Phebus would 
reconvey the royalty interest so assigned to them 
in the event that Stock and Phebus did not pro-
cure the drilling of a test well on the above de-
scribed property, the so-called Ashley Valley 
structure, by the Standard Oil Company of Cali-
fornia, or by some other operator, within six 
months after the completion of a deep test well 
to be first drilled, but not later than the summer 
of 1931, on the Rangely structure in Northwestern 
Colorado, all as provided by the written assign-
ment, copy of which is attached to plaintiff's 
amended complaint as Exhibit 'C'." 
It is apparent fron1 this Finding that the Trial Judge 
has misconstrued Exhibit C and the resulting effect of 
the failure of performance of the conditions contained 
therein. It recites that this instrument was made for a 
valuable consideration, whereas, in fact, the only con-
sideration is the actual drilling of a well as contemplated 
by the agreement, and the Finding fails to recognize 
that the instrument in question is in net effect unilateral 
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Finding of Fact No. 6 reads as follows: (R. 40) 
"That by mesne conveyances and assignment 
the defendants Paul Stock, .Joe rr. Juhan am 
Weber Oil Company have succeeded to and ar, 
now the record holders and owners of said one 
third of one percent oil royalty interest." 
It is obvious that since no rights vested under Ex 
hibit C there never existed any basis upon which Phebu 
or Stock could have later made effective conveyances t~ 
the present respondents. It is interesting to note tha 
there is no instrument subsequent to the time of their fail 
ure to perform the condition of well drilling in January 
1934, which makes any specific reference to Exhibit C 
The importance of these Findings lies in the fact tha 
they show clearly the basic error of the Trial Judge iJ 
analyzing Exhibit C, and are factual findings upon whicJ 
the two Conclusions of Law considered above have pre 
sumably been based. 
POINT IV. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED H 
REFUSING APPELLANT'S TENDER OF PROOF THA~ 
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE $1.00, WITH REFERENCl 
TO THE EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEE~ 
APPELLANT AND PHEBUS AND STOCK, FROM WHICI 
ANY RIGHT OF RESPONDENTS MUST ORIGINATE. 
At page 16 of the Transcript (R. 45), appellant, witl 
reference to whether or not he had received the $1.01 
referred to in the first paragraph of the body of Exhibi 
C, made tender of fact as follows: 
"And in connection with that, I would like t 
make a formal tender of proof in the record tha 
Mr. Preas was in the court room and would ar 
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It is perfectly obvious that this fact has a direct 
bearing on the issues of this case. One of the keys· to a 
determination of such issues lies in establishing the in-
tent of the parties to this agreement. The fact that this 
sum was never paid is a strong indication that none of 
the parties viewed it as having any relation to the real 
consideration of the agreement, and the tender is clearly 
relevant to this point and should have been admitted in 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion appellant asserts that the judgment of 
the Trial Court is in error as it fails to recognize that 
any right of respondents in and to the one-third of one 
per cent oil royalty must necessarily arise from Exhibit 
C, and no rights in respondents could have vested under 
such Exhibit until there had been a performance of condi-
tions set forth therein. Such performance was precedent 
to any such right, and when Phebus and Stock failed to 
perform such conditions within the time limitation set 
forth, expiring in January, 1934, their right, title and 
interest to any claim under this agreement had expired. 
Thereafter appellant was not required to take any af-
firmative action of any kind, nor to demand a re-convey-
ance from Phebus and Stock. F'urther, that the statute 
of limitations which forms the basis of the Trial Court's 
judgment is not applicable because such statute does not 
apply to this action which is a quiet title action to re-
move a cloud, and because, in any event, no adverse 
claim arose until the year 1948, which was less than two 
years from the date of commencement of the instant case. 
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Appellant, therefore, respectfully prays that the 
judgment of the Trial Court be reversed and a decree 
entered establishing appellant's right and title in and to 
the one-third of one per cent royalty here involved, and 
requiring respondent Equity Oil Company to forthwith 
pay to appellant royalty proceeds based upon such 
one-third of one per cent interest from November, 1948, 
to date hereof. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY, 
&SNOW 
Attorneys for Appellarnt. 
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